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The Basic Structure Doctrine in 
Singapore: A Reply 
Introduction 
In The Constitution of Our Constitution: A Vindication of the Basic Structure Doctrine ,1 Mr Calvin Liang and Ms 
Sarah Shi (“the authors”) explore the “‘basic structure doctrine”, which “posits that a constitution has certain 
written or unwritten features so fundamental that they cannot be abrogated through constitutional amendments”, 
in the context of Singapore. They argue that “the Legality Principle against the separation of powers form the 
basic structure of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore”, and that Singapore’s constitutional actors have 
openly acknowledged this. Moreover, they argue that the “basic structure”  must exist by virtue of the very nature 
of a constitution, or at least of Singapore’s Constitution.2 
To the contrary, it is argued in this article that the local case law does not support the “basic structure” doctrine. 
At most, it supports the truism that the Constitution features several fundamental principles, but these principles 
are either not necessarily “basic” in the strict sense of being unchangeable or are too general to be of use as a 
“basic structure”.  Moreover, the reasons for the doctrine of a “basic structure” do not necessitate 
the particular basic structure advocated by the authors or the level of generality at which it has been pitched. 
Instead, the true safeguards against constitutional change that severely curtails subjects’ rights are political in 
nature. 
The Meaning of the Basic Structure Doctrine 
The “basic structure doctrine” comes from the Indian case of Kesavananda Bharati v State of 
Kerela3 (“Kesavananda”). Interestingly, Kesavananda represented an increase, not a decrease, in Parliament’s 
powers of constitutional amendment: the majority (of seven against six) overruled an earlier case4 which held 
that no amendments to the fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution were allowed, favouring instead the 
idea that only the basic structure cannot be amended.   
Some of the Judges in Kesavananda saw the issue as one of imposing legal limits on constitutional 
amendment;5 others saw it as one of pointing out logical limits on constitutional amendment (viz that the 
Constitution cannot be changed so drastically that it ceases to be the same Constitution);6 and yet others merely 
pointed to non-legal political duties not to make certain types of amendment.7In other words, the “basic structure” 
refers to something more than a set of important features of the Constitution: it refers to: (i) features 
that legally or logically cannot be abrogated; or, perhaps, (ii) features that politically should not be abrogated. 
Let us focus on: (i), since (ii) is not the business of the Courts. 
In the constitutional law context, it is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between two meanings of the word 
“basic”: concepts which are very important and concepts which are unchangeable. The two may overlap, but 
are not the same. Let us focus primarily on the second meaning (which is the meaning in  Kesavananda), for 
discussing the first meaning runs the risk of stating the obvious: since all constitutions, by their “very nature”, play 
the basic roles of “power-defining” and “power-limiting”,8 the debate would then become merely a political one 
about the merits of schemes of division of power, and would only become a legal debate if there are schemes 
which are either fundamentally necessary or repugnant to the core of the Constitution. 
There are, therefore, two questions to consider: 
1. Whether there are features of the Singapore Constitution which it is not legally possible to change; and 
2. If not, then whether there are features of the Singapore Constitution which, if removed, would lead to a product 
that is something other than the Singapore Constitution. 
Let us refer to these as “question (1)” and “question (2)”. A study of the cases reveals that the answer to both is 
no. 
Does Singapore’s Constitution Have a “Basic Structure”? 
Let us examine the different contenders for the basic structure of Singapore’s Constitution. 
The “Legality Principle” and the Availability of Judicial Review: Teo 
Soh Lung v Minister for Home Affairs (“Teo Soh Lung (HC)”)9 and Chng 
Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs (“Chng Suan Tze”)10 
In Teo Soh Lung (HC), Chua J rejected the submission that there are constitutional amendments which 
Parliament has no legal power to make; to hold otherwise, he said, would be “usurping Parliament’s legislative 
function contrary to art 58 of the Constitution”.11 He distinguished Kesavananda on the grounds of differences 
between Indian and Singaporean constitutional history.12 
The authors reply that Chua J erred in neglecting the “Legality Principle”13 and in focusing on the text of art 58 to 
the exclusion of the possibility of implied limits to amendment which should be, as the Privy Council appeared to 
suggest in Hinds v R14 (“Hinds”), “taken for granted”.15 However, these arguments do not establish that there are 
legally unchangeable features of the Singapore Constitution.  
The authors begin by asserting the importance of the “Legality Principle” from  Chng Suan Tze that “All power has 
legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary 
power”, which they say flows from “the separation of powers and the need for a system of checks and balances 
on powers”.16 But even if this is true, accepting it merely postpones the question: why is it legally impossible for 
Parliament to abrogate the rule of law? Three problems em erge. 
The first issue has to do with question (1) as defined above. In India, an answer to the question in the previous 
paragraph is based on popular sovereignty: Sikri CJ in Kesavananda said that constitutional amendments which 
go against the popular “common understanding” or ignore it by causing “the very democratic principles which 
[Parliament] appeal[s] to” in invoking the process of constitutional amendment to “disappear” 17 are forbidden. 
This is because, as Shelat J put it, the invocation of popular s overeignty in the Preamble to the Indian 
Constitution is the “key to the understanding of the Constitution”.18 It is also the key to the distinction between the 
constitutional histories of India and of Singapore to which Chua J alluded. 
To be fair, it is unclear whether this means that it is  legally impossible for Parliament to make such constitutional 
amendments in India, or merely that the people reserve the political power to resist such an amendment even if 
it is legally valid. Nonetheless, it does not matter to Singapore, where, by contrast, the power of constitutional 
amendment is not explicitly made ultimately contingent on the approval of some other body such as “the people”, 
nor is the power said to have been delegated by “the people”.  
Second, what, in the context of constitutional amendment, are the “limits” to which the “Legality Principle” as it is 
formulated refers? All that the dictum from Chng Suan Tze says is that judicial review is possible; it says nothing 
about the grounds or standards of review. The “Legality Principle” therefore cannot be used, as the authors do, to 
answer the question of what the content of the “basic structure” is. Moreover, a claim that the “basic structure” is 
simply that there are limits to executive power would answer question (2) affirmatively but be an empty, and thus 
unhelpful, claim: the mere existence of limits to power is a feature inherent in the act of delegation of power; 
since it is by definition impossible for delegated power not to have limits (for, otherwise, it would 
be transferredpower), it would not add anything to say that it is also unlawful.   
Third, similarly, it does not follow from the idea that “all power has legal limits” that “ the courts must be able to 
examine the exercise of discretionary power”19 (emphasis added). While it may be that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the [body with judicial power] to say what the law is”,20 this does not aid our enquiry as it 
tells us nothing about exactly how “the law” in Singapore affects validity or how exactly “the law” says judicial 
review is to be performed. It may be that the basic structure is simply that there must be judicial power, but this 
does not address the question of whether the basic structure renders unlawful certain constitutional amendments 
which define the scope of judicial power. 
In short, besides the circularity in the authors’ asserting the importance of the “Legality Principle” and then 
criticising Chua J’s rejection of the basic structure doctrine because it conflicts with it,21which assumes the very 
thing which the authors aim to prove, the “Legality Principle” does not contain enough content to form a basic 
structure which is fit for purpose. Let us now examine the recent cases cited by the authors to see whether this 
problem may be solved through other principles. 
  
The Separation of Powers: Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor22 (“Yong 
Vui Kong”) and Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public 
Prosecutor23 (“Mohammad Faizal (HC)”) 
It is not necessarily true that that the Legality Principle applied in  Yong Vui Kong cannot be changed by 
Parliament. On the contrary, the Court accepted that it can: in holding that there “will (or should) be few, if any, 
legal disputes between the State and the people from which the judicial power is excluded”24 (emphasis added), 
the Court acknowledged that there may be some matters which are not susceptible to judicial review. There is no 
conflict between this and the “doctrine of separation of powers” which the Court held to be the basis of the 
“fundamental law” of Singapore25and the authors concluded to be part of the basic structure26: the doctrine is 
capable of encompassing partial separation of powers, and, more fundamentally, says nothing about the content 
or scope of those powers. 
The authors characterise Yong Vui Kong as having “trump[ed] the argument that constitutional powers may be 
non-justiciable”.27 However, the hypothetical situations in which review would be available – if the Cabinet were 
biased, acting in bad faith, or in breach of the procedural requirements in art 22P of the Constitution, eg if it did 
not meet to discuss a clemency petition or made its decision based on a coin toss 28 – are not about the 
separation of powers per se; they concern only the manner in which one of the powers is to be exercised. Neither 
do they concern the Courts’ policing the limits to powers: the Legality Principle is concerned with the extent 
of vires,29 not the ways in which discretion is exercised or whether or not it is exercised. 
It may now be argued that it is these grounds of review that form the “basic structure”. But the grounds 
are contingent on legislative approval: the judicial review jurisdiction was said to cover “every legal dispute on a 
subject matter in respect of which Parliament has conferred jurisdiction on”30 (emphasis 
added).  The ratio of Yong Vui Kong – the real reason why the “Legality Principle” can be said to have “trump[ed] 
the argument that constitutional powers may be non-justiciable”31 – is that the power in question was said to be 
a legal power, as opposed to a “purely personal discretion”, for the Court stressed for the first time that only 
“legal powers … have legal limits”32 (emphasis in original). The matter cannot be said to be based on an 
unabrogable basic feature that demands that judicial review be possible, for if, hypothetically, art 22P did not 
exist, then there would be no power of clemency at all and thus no right of judicial review to abrogate. 
These points may be further illustrated by turning briefly to Mohammad Faizal (HC), which the authors cite as the 
“clearest recognition of the basic structure doctrine”.33 In fact, the words “basic structure”34 in that case referred to 
the idea in Hinds that it is, in a Westminster-style constitution, “taken for granted that the basic principle of 
separation of powers will apply”.35. With respect, however, this is not strictly relevant in Singapore, where, to use 
the words of the minority in Hinds, “[t]he principle that there should be a separation of powers between the three 
organs of government is not just taken for granted. Effect is given to that principle by the written terms of the 
Constitution”36 through arts 38, 23(1), and 93 of the Singapore Constitution which explicitly vest legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers in the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary, respectively. The crux 
of Mohammad Faizal was thus not about the separation of powers as a basic structure, but rather about 
the content of the powers, viz  whether sentencing an individual is an exercise of legislative or judicial power. 
Therefore, all that the basic structure doctrine allegedly adds to the law on executive clemency is that the Courts 
have, on occasion, some role to play in reviewing executive actions. This point has already been dealt with 
above.   
The authors also argue that, in Yong Vui Kong, the basic structure doctrine was further used as an “interpretive 
tool”.37 However, the fact that a constitutional principle is so significant that it leads to an interpretive norm does 
not mean that it therefore cannot lawfully be abrogated. On the contrary, if all that the principle does is to give rise 
to implication or interpretation, then surely the latter can be trumped by an express provision to the 
contrary;38 this would not count as an abrogation of the principle, but merely a statement of its scope, ie that it 
simply does not apply in such a manner as to give rise to that implication or in terpretation. 
Constitutional Supremacy: Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General39 (“Tan 
Eng Hong”) 
The authors also seek to link the separation of powers with constitutional supremacy. Thus, they say that the 
Court in Tan Eng Hong “adopted a functional analysis; reasoning from the function of the Constitution to its 
necessary components”, ie from the Constitution’s role in maintaining the rule of law and protecting fundamental 
liberties to the necessary feature of constitutional supremacy.40  With respect, this begs the question: 
constitutional supremacy can only be said to be necessary if we presuppose that the functions of the Constitution 
are necessary, but those functions are themselves defined by the Constitution which claims supremacy.  
Moreover, although it cannot be denied that constitutional supremacy is a vital feature of the Constitution, it does 
not follow that it cannot be abrogated by an Act of Parliament, either because such an amending Act would be 
unlawful or because it would make the Constitution lose its identity. There are at least two ways to look at the 
matter: 
1. First, an Act incompatible with the Constitution is void simply because art 4 says so. Consequently, to attempt 
to repeal art 4 by legislation is not unlawful; it is simply an impossible contradiction in terms. Again, for the 
proposition that the basic structure consists of unabrogable constitutional principles to mean anything, it would 
have to be the case that, if those principles were not part of the basic structure, then it would be  possible (to put 
it loosely, “physically possible”) to abrogate them; this is simply not true in the case of art 4. The answer to 
question (1) is, therefore, no. 
2. Second, if it is lawful by virtue of art 5 for the Legislature to repeal every other provis ion of the Constitution, the 
only basic structure we are left with is that there should exist a document titled Constitution of the Republic of 
Singapore. Again, the answer to question (2) is yes, but only vacuously so. 
The Content of the Basic Structure 
Lessons from Foreign Jurisdictions 
We have seen that many important constitutional principles are not part of the basic structure in 
the Kesavananda sense; the authors’ argument that it follows from the fact that judicial review  has 
been performed without legislative interference that judicial review must be part of the basic structure41 is neither 
here nor there, for it confuses practice and legality.42  But even if they were, another problem arises: exactly how 
is the basic structure to be defined and framed?  There are at least several possibilities. 
The Authors’ Proposal 
One possibility is, as the authors have suggested, that the basic structure is a combination of the Legality 
Principle and the separation of powers.43  But these are, at most, a structure. If there were some 
basic provisions, then answering the question of lawfulness would be as simple as checking whether the 
provision purportedly amended was one of the “basic” ones. By contrast, the Legality Principle and the separation 
of powers are principles which cannot be said either to apply or not, but rather only to apply in different ways or 
to different degrees. For this reason, in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of 
Australia (“Australian Capital Television”), it was held that a provision may only be implied on a “structural” (as 
opposed to “textual”) basis if it is “logically or practically necessary for the preservation of the integrity of that 
structure”. 44 
Democracy and Responsible Government 
In Australian Capital Television, an implied constitutional right of “political communication”45 was said to 
be required by the “concept of representative government and representative democracy”, as evidenced by the 
fact that Members of Parliament and Ministers in Australia were “no t only chosen by the people but exercise their 
legislative and executive powers as representatives of the people”.46 
The Court did not have to consider whether these implied principles were expressly abrogable. But if we 
imagine arguendo that they could not be, this case would illustrate the difficulty of defining the basic structure. 
Which would be a better candidate for the basic structure of Singapore’s Constitution: the Legality Principle, or 
representative democracy? Neither is necessarily more correct. If it is the latter, given the reasoning from the 
provisions in the Australian Constitution about the election of democratic representatives, it may well be that the 
“basic structure” leads to the politicalremedy of removing the unsatis factory members of legislature or the 
executive through democratic processes47 rather than the legal remedy of judicial review.   
Similarly, in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro, it was held that “the Constitution is for the advancement 
of representative government”, and that different types of powers are “capable of assignment … to more than one 
branch [legislative, executive, or judicial] of government … [d]eny that proposition, and you seriously affect the 
recognised working of representative government”.48This is significant because it puts paid to the idea that 
question (2) may be answered by pointing to a particular specific definition of some or all of the three powers.   
  
Fundamental Rights and the Principal Aim of the State  
In Kesavananda too, judicial views differed as to the content of the basic structure. While Sikri CJ listed 
constitutional supremacy; republicanism and democracy; secularism; separation of powers; and 
federalism,49 which are features of the framework of the State, Shelat and Grover JJ added such substantive 
values as human dignity, fundamental freedoms, and welfarism.50 Ray J, by contrast, in rejecting the basic 
structure doctrine, said that the crux of a constitution was the “great ends” of “the safety, the greatness and  the 
well-being of a people”.51 This demonstrates the difficulty in determining not only the specific content of the basic 
structure, but also the level of generality at which it should be described. 
The Particular Role of Judicial Review 
Kesavananda also displays diversity of judicial opinion about the role of judicial review, which was the issue 
in Teo Soh Lung. Shelat and Grover JJ described it as being of “paramount importance” and part of the “heart 
and core of a democracy”;52 Khanna J explicitly said that abrogating it “strikes at the basic structure of the 
Constitution”.53 But Khanna J also warned that, as for the manner in which judicial review is conducted, “Judicial 
Oligarchy” must be avoided as “[t]he proper forum to fight for the wise use of the legislative authority is that of 
public opinion and legislative assemblies”, otherwise “people of fundamentally differing views” may be 
neglected.54 Similarly, Hegde and Mukherjea JJ acknowledged the usefulness of judicial review but suggested 
that legislative checks and balances might sometimes suffice: 
If [a] question … is considered as the exclusive function of the executive, then, not only the judicial 
review will be taken away, even the legislature will not have the opportunity of examining the 
correctness or appropriateness …” (emphasis added).55 
The Case of Singapore 
In Singapore, by contrast, it is difficult to identify a defining overarching principle which, if abrogated, would 
make the Constitution into something other than the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. As we have seen, 
there are various possible candidates for an implied overarching principle. 
As for an express one (as is present in the Constitutions of Mauritius,56 India,57 Germany,58 and Belize,59 to 
which the authors have alluded), the Proclamation of Singapore declares Singapore to be “forever a sovereign 
democratic and independent nation, founded upon the principles of liberty and justice and ever seeking the 
welfare and happiness of her people in a more just and equal society” ,60 but it is doubtful whether this should be 
taken to be more than political rhetoric. The Constitution explicitly mentions sovereignty, independence, and 
liberty;61 the drafters could easily have mentioned explicitly the other values in the Proclamation such as 
“democra[cy]” and “justice” if they wished to make these true constitutional principles. 
Of course, this does not mean that Singapore is not democratic – it patently is in at least one sense, for the 
Constitution specifically provides for elected representatives. Rather, it may be taken to exclude 
a particular conception of democracy, eg “[not only] that the people must decide who should govern them, [but 
also] the principle that fundamental rights should be protected by an impartial and independent judiciary”.62 On 
the other hand, it is  equally plausible that the drafters of the Constitution did intend to enshrine such a view: 
such rights would complement the Legality Principle by describing the “legal limits” to executive and legislative 
power.63  Yet another possible view is that the primary purpose of the “freedoms of the people” is to facilitate 
“free elections” and prevent the “Government so elected … perpetuat[ing] itself”.64 
All these equally plausible possibilities illustrate the difficulty in searching for a “basic structure” or saying that 
“democracy” is the basic structure: such moves either shore up ambiguities that add little to  existing difficulties 
such as determining the appropriate level of “judicial restraint” (it is unclear how the authors’ observation that “the 
basic structure doctrine may not necessarily expand the scope of judicial review”65 (emphasis added) helps to 
address the established common-law problem of determining exactly which the “appropriate cases” in which to 
exercise restraint are), or risk crossing the boundary from constitutional interpretation into imputing to the 
Constitution ideas which are in reality the creation of the common law.   
In short, therefore, we cannot give a definite answer to question (2); even if we could, it is likely that our answer 
would consist “not [of] concrete provisions of the Constitution, but … instead … statements of general 
principles … There can be wide differences of opinion about the scope and application of each of these 
principles… these principles are too general to provide either guidance or any real basis of agreement”.66 
For this reason, the authors’ claim that “it may even be the case that a constitutional am endment to abolish the 
elected presidency may run into basic structure objections even though it is supported by referendum” 67 is 
misconceived.  Even if a basic structure doctrine did apply in Singapore, the Presidency, being  part of the 
Executive, cannot be said to be more “basic” than the existence of the Executive itself. 
Analogies with Foreign Constitutions 
The authors argue that it “seems absurd” to suggest that the basic structure doctrine cannot be said to apply in 
Singapore by analogy with Germany and India because Singapore’s Constitution has no eternity clause (unlike 
art 20 of Germany’s Basic Law) and no popular supremacy clause (unlike the Preamble of India’s 
Constitution).68 However, these differences are highly significant.  
As for Germany, the authors cite a dictum  quoted by the Federal Constitutional Court that “[t]here are 
constitutional principles that are so fundamental and so much an expression of a law that has precedence even 
over the constitution that they also bind the framers of the constitution”. However, in context, the content of these 
“fundamental” “constitutional principles” was the  explicitstatement in art 20(1) of the Basic Law: “The Federal 
Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state”. Hence, the basic structure doctrine applies in 
Germany only as a matter of the “inner unity” of the text of the Basic Law.69 (Interestingly, even this doctrine is 
qualified by art 146 of the Basic Law: “This Basic Law … shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution 
freely adopted by the German people takes effect".) 
The authors cite an article which argues that the idea of an “implied eternity clause” may help distinguish 
between “the amendment of an existing constitution and the establishment of a new constitution”.70 However, it is 
doubtful whether such an “implied” clause can trump express wording to the contrary. Moreover, the difficulty of 
determining exactly what the implied eternity clause covers would remain. 
As for India, Kesavananda suggests that, notwithstanding the majority’s judgments, the basic structure can be 
changed. It may be true that “what Parliament had not given, it could not take away”.71But as Khanna J pointed 
out, “the people in the final analysis are the ultimate sovereign and if they decide to have an entirely new 
constitution, they would not need the authority of the existing constitution for this purpose”, even in the absence 
of an explicit comprehensive scheme for constitutional amendment.72  Indeed, sovereignty is vested in “the 
people of India” as noted in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. 
But the same Preamble recites that “the people” had acted through not just “constituent power” (as the German 
Basic Law states73), but the institution of “our constituent assembly”. It may, therefore, be possible for “extra-
constitutional methods like revolution”74 (not in the sense of violent uprising, but simply in the sense of 
fundamental change) to be led by a democratically representative body – such as the Indian Parliament. The 
debate thus becomes merely one of whether the body is truly democratically representative 75 – an important 
debate, but hardly one that is specific to the particular context of constitutional reform. 
Conclusion: A Political Constitution 
Constitutional theory is all about the balance of power, but this balance need not be struck by purely legal means. 
For example, Dicey posited two political limits to legislative power: the “external limit” (which is that the 
sovereign cannot, in practice, make legislation that subjects will disobey) and “internal limit” (the sovereign will 
not, in practice, make such legislation that it is “hardly conceivable” that it will as it will go against its interest to do  
so).76 
The authors state that a basic structure is necessary for the Constitution to achieve its basic purpose.  But it is 
equally arguable, as the minority said in Hinds that if a “great deal [were] left to necessary implication, [then] a 
written constitution would largely fail to achieve its object. If it does not define clearly what Parliament can do and 
cannot do by ordinary enactment, then the Government and Parliament of a territory may find that as a result of 
judicial decision after a considerable lapse of time all the time spent in legislating has been wasted and that laws 
urgently required have not been validly enacted”.77 The Courts must have some theory behind how they go about 
constitutional interpretation; this theory may well be that “public administration is not principally about stopping 
bad administrative practices but encouraging good ones”.78 
It might seem unthinkable for the Courts to stand idly by in the face of “oppressive and wholly undemocratic 
legislation”.79 But such legislation would be exactly that – validly made legislation, which has the force of law. 
Unless the Courts are willing to abandon the notion that express words, however unsavoury one may think them 
to be, trump implied concepts,80 the Courts will, in such a case, be doing something other than giving effect to 
the law. If, instead, we posit that the limits postulated by Dicey are the true limits to the power of constitutional 
amendment in Singapore, then, while there is a meaningful distinction between amending the Constitution and 
replacing it with a new Constitution,81 in the case of the latter, it should not be assumed that the Courts ought to 
play a leading role in reform. 
Implicit support for this view may be inferred from dicta from Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General, 
where the “green-light” model of the State, which focuses on “seek[ing] good government through the political 
process and public avenues rather than redress[ing] bad government through the courts”,82 was explicitly 
endorsed.83 While the Courts may, in time, see the need to examine more closely the content of legislative 
debates rather than simply assuming that the Legislature has carefully considered all relevan t matters,84 they can 
do so at most as part of the process of interpretation;85 they cannot override the express words of legislation.86 
It is, therefore, submitted that the true position in Singapore is that espoused by Kirby P in  Building Construction 
Employees and Builders’ Labourers Federation of New South Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations 87: 
In the end, it is respect for long standing political realities and loyalty to the desirable notion of elected 
democracy that inhibits any lingering judicial temptation, even in a hard case, to deny loyal respect to the 
commands of Parliament by reference to suggested fundamental rights that run ‘so deep’ that Parliament 
cannot disturb them. 
This conclusion does not leave our citizens unprotected from an oppressive majority in Parliament. The 
chief protection lies in the democratic nature of our Parliamentary institutions. 
To apply a “basic structure doctrine” to the extent of holding that amendments to the contrary are void is 
essentially to denounce a piece of legislation as “not law”. But, as Hart argued, this would neglect the more 
important questions: If it is not truly law, how did it ever come to be considered valid law, not least of all by the 
Legislature itself? Perhaps it, though not truly law, is better than the law? 88  While the question of validity is a 
legal question, these questions are arguably political questions for the people to answer. It is, therefore, best that 
they be answered through democratic fora. 
Courts performing judicial review are, to be sure, democratic institutions as they seek to give effect to democratic 
will89, but, even if their role is cut down, Parliament itself can also be equipped to answer these questions, albeit 
acting qua elected representative body rather than qua legislative authority90 (and perhaps taking a more directly 
representative approach than usual). In fact, notwithstanding the absence of a preamble like that in India’s 
Constitution, it may even be argued that the true Grundnorm  is the social fact of popular sovereignty,91 such that 
even sweeping constitutional change following popular unhappiness with a legislative amendment cannot wholly 
be characterised as being extra-legal. 
In short, the authors have rightly identified the Legality Principle and the separation of powers as key 
constitutional principles, but these principles may well play out in such a way as to suggest th at the Singapore 
Constitution is not only a legal document, but also a political one. The Constitution seeks to protect individual 
rights and uphold the rule of law, and it does so by separating each branch of the State and by establishing 
mutual checks and balances, but it is not at all clear that it does so via an immutable “basic structure”. This is, 
furthermore, not a bad thing: while enduringness is a strength of a constitution, inflexibility can be just as much a 
weakness.92 
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